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NOTES AND COMMENT
This decision is apparently sound upon the facts of the case, the
city having permitted the partial obstruction of the street was
justly held bound to anticipate a dangerous condition which might
naturally follow. However, it is equally evident as the court points
out that such a ruling should not be applied to a case where the
injury results from an ordinary accumulation of oil and grease
upon the streets, for to so hold would make the city a guarantor
of conditions which are the natural incidents to the use of the
streets, conditions which drivers of automobiles are bound to risk.
Another point to be considered in the doctrine of constructive
notice is that evidence of prior accidents caused by the dangerous
condition is competent as tending to show that proper officials had
notice thereof.35 The reason for this is that experience indicates
that the publicity necessarily given these accidents is such that
notice of them generally is communicated to some officer charged
with a duty in respect to repairing the streets.
To summarize, it may be said generally that when an injury occurs
as a prommate result of some negligent act of the city, or some one
under its direction and control, i. e., independent contractors,
licensees to obstruct the streets, etc., the city is chargeable with
notice by reason of its own participation. Neither actual nor con-
structive notice is necessary But where the city is not a partici-
pant, either directly or indirectly in producing the cause of the
injury, its liability can only be predicated on notice, either actual
or constructive. PHmYLIS CAVENDER.
THE ADMISSIEILITY Op TESTIMONY CONCERNING TRANsAcTIoNs
WIT DECEDEmNS. This is written to supplement the article appear-
mg In 1 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEw 21 on this subject, and covers
all the Washington decisions thereon from Volume 133 to and in-
eluding Volume 153.
Since the former article was written the 1927 Legislature amended
the statute2 by adding the words "or in his presence" after the
words "or any statement made to him." The object of this amend-
ment was merely to make the language of the statute conform to
the interpretation previously given to it by the Supreme Court in
Nicholson v. Kilbury,3 where it was held that although the statute
did not expressly exclude testimony as to statements made by the
2l'Piper -v. Spokane, 22 Wash. 147, 60 Pac. 138 (1900).
'Under heading VIII on page 28 of the former article, "admissible"
should read "inadmissible." Citations of Olsen v. Kernoe on page 32 is
now found in 132 Wash. 250; Perkns v. Allen, under heading C on page 38,
in 133 Wash. 459; and Chaffee v. Morris, under heading XIII on page 43,
Is now found (In re Hebbs' Estate) in 134 Wash. 424, 429, 235 Pac. 974.
The same headings will be used herein as in the former article.
2 Laws of 1927, chap. 84, p. 64. Rem. Comp. Stat., 1927 Sup., Sec. 1211.
' 80 Wash. 500, 141 Pac. 1043 (1914).
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decedent to a third person in the presence of, but not to, the
interested witness, nevertheless such testimony is inadmissible
under the express language of the statute as amended.
VI. DERIVING RIGHT OR TITLE THROUGH THE DECEASED
Where defendant, a tenant under a farm cropping lease, gave
plaintiff bank a chattel mortgage upon his share of the crop, and
thereafter the landlord died, the court held, in an action by the
mortgagee against the mortgagor and a subsequent purchaser of
the crop, that the trial court properly admitted testimony of
defendant, the tenant, with reference to a subsequent surrender
of the lease to the landlord, for the reason that the plaintiff was
not suing in any of the capacities enumerated in the statute and
that plaintiff bank did not derive right or title through the deceased
landlord, but its rights were derived through defendant, the
tenant.'
VII. GUARDIAN OF ESTATE OF INSANE PERSON OR MINOR
Where defendant has since become insane and appears by guar
dian ad litem, the plaintiff may not testify as to a transaction had
with the defendant before his insanity I
Where a written settlement agreement was made between former
husband and wife and thereafter the wife became mentally incom-
petent, in an action brought by the wife by her guardian against
the husband, the husband may not testify to transactions between
them relative to the execution and delivery of the written settle-
ment agreement.6
VIII. PARTY IN INTEREST
b. Joint Owner or Heir of Community Property or
Separate Property
In an action by the son of the deceased against the administratrix
to establish an alleged gift by the deceased to plaintiff, the court
comments that it is plain that plaintiff seeks recovery upon the
theory of a gift to himself separately, and not a gift to himself
and wife jointly, or to his wife separately, because in either of the
latter events the wife's testimony in support of the alleged gift
as to delivery would be inadmissible, because she then would be a
party in interest. The court also stated that, of course, the plaintiff
could not himself testify as to the gift.'
First National Bank v. Melberg, 54 Wash. Dec. 27, 28, 280 Pac. 745
(1929)
'Pacheco v. Mello, 139 Wash. 566, 577, 247 Pac. 927 (1926).
sHill v. Scheer 53 Wash. Dec. 53 55, 279 Pac. 391 (1929).
'Vinng v. Butler 138 Wash. 646, 649, 650, 244 Pac. 961 (1926).
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In an action against the executor of an estate to recover property
alleged to have been given to plaintiff by the deceased, the father
and mother of the plaintiff are not parties in interest, and there-
fore may testify as to transactions with the deceased. The mere
contingency that they might inherit from the plaintiff, their daugh-
ter, if she died intestate, unmarried and without issue, is too'remote
to bring them within the ban of the statute."
XI. SUBJECT MATTER Op TESTIMONY TRANSACTIONS WITH
THE DECEASED
a. In General
Testimony as to an alleged gift made by a person since deceased
constitutes testimony as to a transaction with the deceased, which
comes within the ban of the statute.!
In an action to recover damages for fraud, in which one of the
defendants, the broker, in the transaction, died before trial and his
admnistratrix was substituted, the plaintiff's testimony as to the
alleged fraudulent transactions and conversations with the deceased
broker were properly excluded as against his estate, and such tes-
timony could only be considered as against the other defendants.10
b. Execution, Delivery and Alteration of Deeds, Notes and Other
Written Instruments
In an action brought by a former business associate of the
deceased against his estate, involving testimony by the plaintiff
as to the identification of the signature of the deceased on a bill
of sale and that plaintiff received the bill of sale from the deceased,
it was held "exceedingly doubtful but that the evidence was adns-
sible." The court held, however, that in any event, as the case was
tried without a jury and there was ample other testimony of dis-
interested witnesses to the same effect, the admission of this testi-
mony of the plaintiff was not prejudicial.
In an action to set aside a deed given by plaintiffs to defendant
and for declaration of a tiust as to the land conveyed, where de-
fendant had become insane and appeared by guardian ad litem,
the plaintiffs cannot testify as to the transaction with defendant
whereby they executed and delivered the deed conveying the prop-
erty to him, as this relates to a transaction had with a person who
has subsequently become insane, and hence is inadmissible. 1
°Mott v. McDonald, 146 Wash. 638, 641, 264 Pac. 1003 (1928).
0 Vintng v. Butler, 138 Wash. 646, 649, 650, 244 Pac. 961 (1926).
2o Blouen v. Quimpere Cannng Company, 139 Wash. 436, 439, 247 Pac.
940 (1926).
'Pacheco v. Mello, 139 Wash. 566, 577, 247 Pac. 927 (1926).
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In an action upon a promissory note against the executor of the
deceased maker, the court properly permitted plaintiff to testify
to his familiarity with the handwriting of the deceased, and prop-
erly permitted him to identify the signature of the deceased on the
note, as this was not testimony concerning a transaction with the
deceased. The court followed the rule as stated in Goldsworthy v.
Oliver" and refused to follow cases from other states adhering to
the contrary rule on account of the difference in the statute of this
state. 13
In an action on a written settlement contract between former
husband and wife, where plaintiff, the former wife, has since
become mentally incompetent, and sues by her guardian, the court
properly excluded testimony of the defendant as to transactions
with the former wife relative to and at the time of the execution
and delivery of the written settlement contract. The court re-
affirmed the absolute and unconditional nature of the rule in cases
falling within the ban of the statute, quoting with approval
O'Connor v. Slatter 4
c. Agreement With the Deceased
A party in interest or to the record may not testify in his own
behalf as to an oral agreement made by hun with a person since
deceased, as such testimony relates to a transaction with, or state-
ment by the deceased, and comes within the inhibition of the
estate. 5
XII. SUBJECT MATTER op' TESTIMONY EXCLUDED STATEMENTS
MADE BY DECEASED
In an action against an administratrix for accounting as between
co-tenants, the court properly excluded testimony of plaintiff as to
an oral agreement and conversation between plaintiff and the
deceased."
In an action on an oral contract, testimony of the plaintiff as to
his conversation with one of the defendants who had died before
trial is inadmissible1 7
In an action brought by an administrator to recover for wrong-
ful death in an automobile accident, the testimony of defendant's
" 93 Wash. 67, 69, 160 Pac. 4 (1916)
"Hewett v. Budwzck, 145 Wash. 405, 406, 260 Pac. 247 (1927).
1 48 Wash. 493, 495, 93 Pac. 1078 (1908) Hill v. Scheer 53 Wash. Dec.
53, 55, 279 Pac. 391 (1929).
5 In re Foster's Estate, 139 Wash. 224, 227, 246 Pac. 290 (1926) Rotter
v. Wendorf, 140 Wash. 593, 596, 250 Pac. 26 (1926) Klopfenstezn v. Eads,
143 Wash. 104, 105, 254 Pac. 854, 256 Pac. 333 (1927).
"In re Foster's Estate, 139 Wash. 224, 227, 246 Pac. 290 (1926).
" Rotter v. Wendorf, 140 Wash. 593, 596, 250 Pac. 26 (1926).
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driver, with whom the deceased was riding as a guest, is not
admissible as to what the deceased said or as to what was said to
him concerning taking the deceased on the trip in defendant's
truck.1 8
CONCLUSION
It will thus be seen that the decisions of our Supreme Court dur-
ing the last four and one-half years have adhered closely to the
former decisions in this state upon the subject and to what we
believe may be considered a fair, sound and correct interpretation
and application of this important statute.
ELWOOD HUTCHESON.*
SUPREmE COURT RULE III oF PLFAUn.G, PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE
-A!END Mm TS AND IRREGULARITIES. Can Rule I.1 governing
amendments and irregularities, be invoked by the Supreme Court
voluntarily after the trial and after judgment of dismissal for fail-
ure of proof 7 In the case of Porter v. Baretiche in which the com-
plaint was predicated upon an express contract, the action pro-
ceeded regularly to trial and resulted in judgment for the full
amount claimed in favor of the plaintiff-respondent. Defendant's
answer prayed for judgment of dismissal. In the opinion, the Su-
preme court said.
"We are also convinced from' the record before us that
appellants never intended to deal with Perry E. Joy or to
purchase any machine from him. This being true, re-
spondent cannot recover upon the contract sued upon."
Further in the opinion, the Court said.
"In view of the liberal rules of practice now in force
concernings amendments (Rule III, etc.), we will not or-
der the action dismissed, but the judgment appealed from
is reversed with directions to the trial court to hear testi-
mony as to the reasonable value of the cash register, and
such other testimony as may be offered by either party
and deemed admissible under the rules of evidence."
The defendant had not made any motion for a new trial but ap-
pealed from the final judgment upon the merits. No motion was
made by the plaintiff at any time to amend the complaint. He
stood consistently upon the contract, upon which the Supreme
Court says he cannot recover. He sought neither in the trial court
2Kopfenstetu v. Eads, 143 Wash. 104, 105, 254 Pac. 854, 256 Pac. 333
1140 Wash. XXXVI.
'53 Wash. Dec. 476, 280 Pac. 78 (1929).
